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Abstract. Savage's framework of subjective preference among acts pro-
vides a paradigmatic derivation of rational subjective probabilities within
a more general theory of rational decisions. The system is based on a set
of possible states of the world, and on acts, which are functions that
assign to each state a consequence. The representation theorem states
that the given preference between acts is determined by their expected
utilities, based on uniquely determined probabilities (assigned to sets of
states), and numeric utilities assigned to consequences. Savage's deriva-
tion, however, is based on a highly problematic well-known assumption
not included among his postulates: for any consequence of an act in some
state, there is a \constant act" which has that consequence in all states.
This ability to transfer consequences from state to state is, in many
cases, miraculous { including simple scenarios suggested by Savage as
natural cases for applying his theory. We propose a simplication of the
system, which yields the representation theorem without the constant
act assumption. We need only postulates P1-P6. This is done at the cost
of reducing the set of acts included in the setup. The reduction excludes
certain theoretical innitary scenarios, but includes the scenarios that
should be handled by a system that models human decisions.
Keywords: subjective expected utility, Savage's postulates, constant
acts, context-dependent decision making
1 Introduction
In his classic The Foundations of Statistics1 Savage sets up a foundational sys-
tem within which he derives both subjective probabilities and utilities from the
preferences of a rational agent, provided that the preferences satisfy certain plau-
sible postulates. The upshot is that the expected utilities come out as a measure
that denes the agent's given preferences. The derivation relies however on ad-
ditional implicit assumptions, one of which, the CAA discussed below, is quite
problematic. Let us rst recall the basic structure of the Savage system. It is
based on the following four components:
1 The rst edition [4] of Savage's book was published in 1954, all citations made in
this paper refer to the second and revised edition [5] published in 1972.
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1. A set S of states (or states of the world),
2. A set C of consequences, which are the consequences of the agent's acts,
3. A set A of acts, where each act is a function, f , which associates with every
state, s, the consequence f(s) of performing f in a world that is in state s,
4. The (rational) agent's preference relation, <, dened over acts, which is a total
preorder. Here, as is customary in current mathematics, \preorder" means a
reexive and transitive relation. A preorder is total or complete if for any f; g
either f < g or g < f .
The intended meaning of f < g is: f is weakly preferable to g, i.e., is at least
as good as g; it is also written g 4 f . If both f < g and g < f , then we denote
it by f  g. Obviously this is an equivalence relation, it means that f and g
are equi-preferable: the agent considers them to be equally good. We dene:
f  g =Df f < g and g 6< f . This means that f is strictly preferred to g. Note
that our notation and terminology dier from Savage's and this can be more than
a technicality. For instance, after dening \constant acts" he does not use this
term and one has to infer that certain acts are constant only from the notation;
that notation, however, is sometimes ambiguous.2
Other elements are introduced in Savage's presentation at later stages, as the
system is being developed in the book. Thus, there are events, which are sets of
states that form, under the usual set-theoretic operations, a Boolean algebra, B,
in which S is the universal set. And there is the notion of conditional preference,
that is: f < g given E where E is an event, which is dened using P2 (the sure-
thing postulate) and which is supposed to express what the agent prefers under
the assumption that s 2 E. Furthermore, for any f; g 2 A, the combination of
f and g with respect to an event E, in symbols f jE + gjE, is dened as: f(s) if
s 2 E, g(s) if s 2 E, where E = S   E is the compliment of E with respect to
S.3 We sometimes refer to this operation as \cut-and-paste". This notation can
be easily generalized to dene combinations of n many acts: f1jP1 +   + fnjPn
is the act h such that h(s) = fi(s) for s 2 Pi (i = 1; : : : ; n), and this is used
under the assumption that P1; : : : ; Pn is a partition of the set of all states.
1.1 The Problem of the Constant-act Assumption
One crucial element of the system is the notion of constant acts or, in Savage's
phrasing, \acts that are constant" (p.25). The idea is that a constant act has
the same consequence in all states. To be precise, being a constant act is not a
2 Savage's \simple ordering" is, in our terminology, a total preorder. He uses `F ' for
the set of consequences and he characterizes total preorders as \simple orderings". In
particular, he uses boldface letters f , g, : : : for acts and italics f , g, : : : for values of
\acts that are constant", writing f  g when f(s) = g for all states s. He also uses `f '
for constant act whose value is f . Furthermore, he sometimes switches to italicized
notation even when the function is not constant, as he does in the statement of P4
on p.31, where he writes fA(s) instead of fA(s), or in Theorem 1 on page 70, where
he writes f(s) = fi instead of f(s) = fi as he should.
3 Some writers use `f E g' or `fEg' or `

f on E, g on E

' for combined acts.
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property of a single act, but is subject to an axiom that applies to a bunch of acts:
the preference between two constant acts, given some event, does not depend
on the event. The fth postulate (P5) posits the existence of two non-equivalent
constant acts.
Savage's representation theorem claims that a preference relation that satis-
es the postulates determines a unique (nitely additive) probability on B and
a utility function (unique up to a linear transformation) which assigns numeric
utilities to consequences, such that f < g i the expected utility of f is greater
or equal to that of g. The derivation of a probability and a utility is carried out
in two stages. In the rst stage a nitely additive probability is derived from
a preference relation, which satises the postulates P1{P6. As far as constant
acts are concerned, this derivation does not require more than P5 (the existence
of two non-equivalent constant acts is sucient). But in the second stage|the
derivation of a utility in chapter 5|Savage tacitly assumes the following:
CAA (constant-acts assumption) For every consequence a 2 C there exists
a constant act ca, such that ca(s) = a, for all s 2 S.
Note that after introducing \acts that are constant" Savage hardly uses the
term anymore and one has to infer that such and such acts are constant only
from the notation, which is not always consistent (see Footnote 2). Fishburn ([2])
who observed that CAA is required for the proof of the representation theorem,
has also pointed out the problematic nature of CAA (cf. Footnote 4 below).
Among others who have also emphasized the need for CAA in Savage's system
are [3,6,7]. This assumption, we shall argue, does not sit well with certain simple
scenarios of decision making, which Savage considers as the kind of situations
that his system is supposed to handle.
The diculty is the fact that the very possibility of some consequence may
depend on the world being in a certain state: the consequence could not exist in
a dierent state of the world. At the beginning of his book ([5, p.14]) Savage
proposes the following omelet-making problem to illustrate the way his system
works. The agent, call him John (in the book it is `you'), has to nish making
an omelet, which was begun by his wife. She broke into a bowl ve good eggs
and John nds a sixth egg, which can be added to the bowl or thrown away (we
assume that there is no option of keeping it for future use). John does not know
if the egg is good or rotten and has to decide between three acts: (1) Break it
into the bowl (2) break it into a saucer to see if it is good or rotten (3) throw
it away. There are two possible states of the world good and rotten, which are
determined by the state of the sixth egg. The consequences of each act are given
in Table 1.1, as it appears in the book.
John's ranking of the acts (that is, his preference relation, <) reects both
his probabilistic estimates regarding the likeliness of each state, as well as the
utility values of the consequences; for example, if he is suciently condent that
the egg is good and if washing the saucer is, for him, of considerable nuisance,
he will prefer \break into bowl" to \break into saucer". His preferences for these
three acts cannot, of course, determine the probabilities and utilities, but if the
set of acts over which the preference relation is dened is suciently rich (where
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Table 1.1: Savage omelet example.
Act
State
Good Rotten
break into bowl six-egg omelet no omelet and all ve
eggs destroyed
break into saucer six-egg omelet and a
saucer to wash
ve-egg omelet and a
saucer to wash
throw away ve-egg omelet and one
good egg wasted
ve-egg omelet
\suciently rich" is determined by the postulates), then we get probabilities and
utilities. Obviously the consequence \six-egg omelet" means an omelet made of
the six eggs of the story, in the case where the sixth egg is good. Yet CAA requires
that there should be a constant act that yields that consequence also in the state
in which the sixth egg is rotten. It would involve a miraculous production of a
good six-egg omelet out of ve good eggs and a rotten one.4
The problem arises also in the second scenario, which Savage proposes for
the very purpose of clarifying what is implied by a constant act (ibid. p.25). A
person, call her Jane, plans to go with friends on a picnic, and she has to choose
between buying a tennis racquet and buying a bathing suit (assume that buying
both is ruled out for nancial reasons). The bathing suit would be handier if the
picnic is held near water where one can swim; the racquet would be better, if
the picnic is not held near water but near a tennis court. One might consider the
possession of a bathing suit and the possession of a tennis racquet as constant,
state-independent consequences. But Savage makes it clear that this would not
do, since the preference order of possessing a racquet and possessing a bathing
suit depends on the state of the world, where the state of the world includes
the picnic-location. Savage argues that the payos should be entities such as: \a
refreshing swim with friends, or sitting on a shadeless beach twiddling a brand-
new tennis racquet while one's friends swim". That, however, does not make
the constant-acts problem easier. To get a constant act, we have to appeal to
the theoretical possibility that while Jane sits on a shadeless beach twiddling a
brand new tennis racket, she has somehow the enjoyment of a refreshing swim
with her friends.
Perhaps the constant-acts problem is not so dicult if we consider getting
sums of money, or some other quantitative goods, as being of equivalent value to
4 In passing, Fishburn ([2, p.166-7]) also voiced this unsatisfactory feature of CAA.
He pointed out that, for any states s; s0 2 S, if W (s) and W (s0) are respectively
the sets of consequences that may occur under s and s0, then it might well be that
W (s) 6= W (s0) (or even that W (s) \W (s0) = ;), in which case the CAA fails. He
remarked that he is not aware of any axiomatic system that does not make the
assumption that W (s) = W (s0) = C for all s; s0 2 S, and he left this line of research
as an open question (see also [1, p.162]).
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the consequences in question. In the omelet scenario, John may consider getting
$k as being equivalent to a six-egg omelet and this can serve also as a payo
in the state \rotten". But it is not clear what the equivalence of $k with a
six-egg omelet means in the given context where John has to nish making the
omelet. We may consider replacing Table 1.1 by the following table, in which
the entries are dollar amounts; this would turn the problem into a problem of
choosing between gambles. (Obviously, k is assumed to be the largest payo, l is
Act
State
Good Rotten
Gamble 1 $k $l
Gamble 2 $m $n
Gamble 3 $p $q
the smallest, m > n and q > n.) And we may consider oering John the choice of
not completing the task { throwing out all eggs { and getting in return to choose
a gamble from the table above. But this articial dubious device undermines the
big attraction of Savage's system: its ability to evaluate consequences that do
not consist in winning or loosing sums of money or goods. If all consequences
are to be replaced by dollar sums before the system is applied, the main point
of the system is lost.
One objective of this paper is to show that CAA is not required for applying
Savage's system to any nitistic problem, that is to say, a problem that is stated
in terms of nitely many evants, nitely many acts and nitely many possible
consequences. All that we need is the existence of two distinguished constant
acts.
1.2 The Signicance of the Set of Acts and the Boolean Algebra
The weaker the postulates and the presuppositions which are needed to get the
representation theorem, the stronger the theorem is. The basic presupposition
of Savages system is that the preference relation is dened over some very rich
set of acts. In some places Savage even considers every function from states to
consequences to be an act, in situations in which the set of states, as well as the
set of consequences, has the cardinality of the continuum. This is exorbitant.
Of course the set of acts should be sucient for handling the kind of problems
that the system is designed for. As a rule, these problems are stated in terms of
nitely many simple acts, where a simple act is an act, f , which has nitely many
values, such that, f 1(x) is an event (a member of the Boolean algebra B) for
each consequence x that is a value of f . Such acts are called by Savage gambles. It
is easily seen that a simple act, f , can be written in the form f = f jP1+: : :+f jPn,
where P1; : : : ; Pn is a partition of S, Pi = f
 1(xi) and the xi are consequences.
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In the initial scenario the agent is supposed to decide between given op-
tions that belong to some nite set of simple acts. P6 implies however that the
preference is to be dened over richer sets that involve more rened events (cf.
Theorem 2.3 below). But, as we shall show, we never need more than simple
acts. (In Section 3, we comment on how our model can be generalized to treat
certain innitary cases.)
Now the richness of the set of acts is also determined by the richness of the
Boolean algebra B of events, namely the collection of subsets that constitute
events. As noted, Savage considers possibilities in which this Boolean algebra
consists of all subsets of real numbers. But his proof of the representation theo-
rem requires only that it be a -algebra, that is, closed under unions of countable
many sets. Our results can be now stated as follows:
i. While we assume that the Boolean algebra is a -algebra, we can derive the
representation theorem if we consider only a preference dened over simple
acts, which include two non-equivalent constant ones.
ii. Moreover, we can also give up the assumption that the algebra is a -algebra
and get the representation theorem, nonetheless. In fact, we need only a
countable Boolean algebra so that the simple acts dened over it satisfy P6.
(i) is proved by using Savage's derivation of probabilities from two constant acts.
We deviate from him in the derivation of expected utilities for simple acts (where
the set of consequences is arbitrary). In the next section, we lay out the basic
ideas behind our construction, the full technical details will be left to the full
paper. (ii) is a more dicult result that is based on a more dicult derivation
of probabilities. We do not have the space for getting into it here.
2 Context-dependent Decision-making
2.1 Subjective Probability
To derive subjective probability from preferences, Savage uses P1-P6. The con-
struction starts with a derivation of qualitative probabilities.
Denition 2.1 For any events E;F , say that E is weakly more probable than
F , written E  F , if, for any constant acts ca and cb such that ca < cb,
cajE + cbjE < cajF + cbjF: (2.1)
Savage's P4 guarantees that (2.1) does not depend on the choice of the pair of
constant acts. It is also not dicult to show that < is a qualitative probability.
The task is to show that this qualitative probability admits a numerical repre-
sentation: there exists a real-valued probability measure  dened on an algebra
of events satisfying:
E  F () (E)  (F ): (2.2)
Savage's proof of the existence of a quantitative probability that satises
(2.2) requires the assumption that the algebra of events is closed under countable
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unions, i.e., it is a -algebra. (That one can do without this assumption is, as
noted above, the content of our second result.) So far only two non-equivalent
constant acts are required.5
Theorem 2.2 (Savage) Let < be a preference relation among acts. Suppose
that < satises P1-6 and that the Boolean algebra B of events is a -algebra,
then there exists a unique (nitely additive) probability measure  for which (2.2)
holds.
The proof of the theorem establishes also the following theorem, which holds
under the assumption that the algebra of events is a -algebra.
Theorem 2.3 Given the probability measure  obtained above, for any event E
and any 0    1, there exists some F  E such that (F ) = (E).
Note that, unlike Theorem 2.2, Theorem 2.3 fails if the assumption that the
Boolean algebra is a -algebra is omitted. A weaker version of it holds: The set
of all  for which the equality holds is dense in (0; 1).
2.2 Utility for All Acts
The following are some simple properties of the two distinguished constant acts,
which are immediate from the denitions above and Theorem 2.2.
Lemma 2.4 For any events E;F ,
1. (E) > (F ) i c1jE + c0jE  c1jF + c0jF ,
2. (E) = (F ) i c1jE + c0jE  c1jF + c0jF .
We show that, under P1-6 and the assumption that there exist two constant
acts c0 and c1, the agent's preferences can be represented by a utility function
in Savage's system without appealing to CAA. To this end, we rst observe that
to each act f 2 A satisfying c1 < f < c0 there corresponds a combined act using
the two distinguished constant acts which is indierent to f under <.
Lemma 2.5 For and f 2 A, if c1 < f < c0, there exists an event Ef such that
c1jEf + c0jEf  f: (2.3)
In proving this lemma, we make full use of the derived personal probability 
from Theorem 2.2, the proof given here is somewhat standard in utility theory.
Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the general method involved in the proof,
where c1jEf + c0jEf is the act that yields c1 if Ef occurs, status quo otherwise.
The aim is to nd the appropriate Ef so that the given event f is indierent to
this combined act.
5 This observation is also noted in [1, p.161] where the author remarked that \[as far
as obtaining a unique probability measure is concerned] Savage's C [i.e., the set of
consequences] can contain as few as two consequences." See [2, x14.1-3] for a clean
exposition of Savage's proof of (2.2), and see especially x14.3 for an illustration of
the role of P1-6 played in deriving numerical probability.
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Fig. 2.1: The case where c1 < f < c0
Proof of Lemma 2.5. Let us consider the following two sets of events.
B : =
n
E
 c1E + c0E < fo;
C : =
n
E
 c1E + c0E 4 fo: (2.4)
It is easily seen that B and C are nonempty, for at least we have S 2 B and ; 2 C.
Let  be the probability measure derived from Theorem 2.2, Next, consider the
following sets dened in terms of B;C and :
B : =
n
(E)
 E 2 Bo;
C : =
n
(E)
 E 2 Co: (2.5)
Let  = inf B and  = supC. Note that, for any a > , there must exist
some a0 2 B such that a > a0   (for, otherwise, a is a lower bound of
B strictly greater than , which contradicts the assumption  = inf B).
Since a0 2 B then, by the denition of B in (2.5), there is some event, say,
F 0 2 B such that (F 0) = a0. Further, let F be an event such that (F ) = a (the
existence of F is guaranteed by Theorem 2.3). Then, by Lemma 2.4, (F ) = a >
(F 0) = a0   implies c1jF + c0jF  c1jF 0+ c0jF 0 < f: It follows, via P1, that,
for any F ,
(F ) >  =) F =2 C: (2.6)
The contrapositive of (2.6) says that, for any F , F 2 C implies that (F )  .
In other words,  is an upper bound of C, and hence  = supC  . Using
a symmetric argument one can show that   . Hence  = .
Next, let Ef be such that (Ef ) = 
 =  (again, the existence of Ef
is guaranteed by Theorem 2.3). The proof is completed if we can show that
Ef 2 B \C. Suppose, to the contrary, Ef =2 B, then, by P1, f  c1jEf + c0jEf :
The latter implies, via P6, there exists a partition fPigni=1 such that,
c1
Pi +  c1Ef + c0EfPi for all i = 1; : : : ; n; (2.7)
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that is,
f  c1
Ef [ Pi + c0Ef [ Pi for all i = 1; : : : ; n: (2.8)
Then, it follows that Ef [ Pi 2 C for all i = 1; : : : ; n. On the other hand, note
that Pi's form a partition of S, we consider two cases:
(1) If for some Pj in the partition we have (Ef [ Pj) > (Ef ) = , then, by
(2.6), Ef [ Pj =2 C, a contradiction.
(2) If (Ef [ Pj)  (Ef ) =  for all j = 1; : : : ; n, then it is easily seen that
(Ef ) = 1. By Lemma 2.4(2), it follows that c1jEf+c0jEf  c1jS+c0jS = c1,
and hence Ef 2 B, but this contradicts the hypothesis Ef =2 B.
Hence, Ef must be in B. Similarly, it can be shown that Ef 2 C. Then we have
Ef 2 B \ C. This completes the proof of the lemma. ut
Remark 1. 1. In light of the lemma, for any f 2 A satisfying c1 < f < c0, let
Ef be such that (2.3) holds, we dene the utility of f to be
U [f ] := (Ef ); (2.9)
where  is obtained through Theorem 2.2 and Ef is from (2.3).
2. Notice that, if there exists another event E0f for which (2.3) holds, then we
have c1jEf+c0jEf  c1jE0f+c0jE0f . It follows, via Lemma 2.4(2), that (E0f ) =
(Ef ), hence U [f ] is well dened.
3. For the two distinguished constant acts c1 and c0, trivially we have Ec1 = S
and Ec0 = ;, then (2.9) yields that U [c1] = 1 and U [c0] = 0.
4. It is plain that U does not need to be uniquely dened by (2.9): if h is
any monotonically increasing function on the reals (or any order preserving
function), then U can also be dened by h  .
5. If f  c1 (or c0  f), it is easy to see that Lemma 2.5 can be adjusted to show
that there exists some Ef such that f jEf +c0jEf  c1 (or c1jEf +f jEf  c0),
in which case U can be dened standardly as in (2.11) below.
Theorem 2.6 Let < be a preference relation over acts, if < satises P1-6, then
there exists a real-valued function U on A satisfying, for all f; g 2 A,
f < g () U [f ]  U [g]; (2.10)
where
U [f ] :=
8><>:
1
(Ef )
if f  c1;
(Ef ) if c1 < f < c0;
(Ef )
(Ef ) 1 if c0  f:
(2.11)
2.3 Context-dependent Expected Utility for Simple Acts
We now proceed to show that, assuming P1-6, the utility of a simple act can be
further expressed as its expected utility of its consequences. Let us denote the set
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of all simple acts by A0. Recall that a simple act f 2 A0 is one that has a nite
number of consequences, say, x1; : : : ; xn, and let P1; : : : ; Pn be the corresponding
sets of states under which they obtain. It is easily seen that fPigni=1 forms a
partition of S:
Pi = f
 1(xi) (i = 1; : : : ; n);
Pi \ Pj = ; (i 6= j) and
n[
i=1
Pi = S:
(2.12)
We seek to dene a context-dependent utility function u over consequences such
that the utility of a simple act U [f ] can be represented by its expected utility:
U [f ] =
nX
i=1
(Pi)u(Pi; xi); (2.13)
where u(Pi; xi) is the utility of consequences xi given Pi. As it will be shortly
shown, in all cases in which (Pi) > 0 this value depends only on the conse-
quence xi. And this value is the same across dierent acts. We thus can speak
of context-dependent utilities. We can assign utilities to consequences, but these
utilities can be used for the purpose of calculating expected utilities as long as the
consequence is obtained as a value of states that constitute a set of probability
greater than 0.
We adopt the following notation:
cx(s) :=
(
x if s 2 E;
0 if s =2 E; for some E 2 B. (2.14)
We refer to cx as a locally constant act which yields x in all states in E, 0 (status
quo) otherwise. It is obvious that cx is a generalization of Savage's notion of
constant act. Now with (2.14), a simple act f satisfying (2.12) can be expressed
by the combination of a series of locally constant acts as follows
f = cx1 jP1 +   + cxn jPn: (2.15)
The goal is to represent simple acts in the form of (2.15) by expected utilities.6
Observe that, if (Pi) = 0 for some Pi, then the term (Pi)u(Pi; xi) in (2.13)
6 Savage ([5, p.71]) uses
P
i ifi to denote the class of simple acts for which, to use
his notations, there exist partitions Bi of S such that P (Bi) = i and f(s) = fi for
s 2 Bi. He further remarks that if a simple act f is such that \the consequences
fi will befall the person in case Bi occurs, then the value of f is independent of
how the partition Bi is chosen." In other words, his utility function, once derived,
is state-independent. We, on the other hand, take that the value of a consequence
depends on the states under which it obtains. Thus, we allow that for two simple
acts f; g with dierent partitions fPigni=1 and fQigni=1 for which (Pi) = (Qi) and
f(s) = g(t) for s 2 Pi and t 2 Qi (i = 1; : : : ; n), f 6 g. That is, we allow Theorem
1 ([5, p.70]) to fail in our decision model where utilities are context-dependent.
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is 0, in which case consequence xi can be seen as having no contribution to the
total utility calculation. As a rule, one can assign in this situation an arbitrary
nite value to the consequence f(s) where s 2 Pi. If, on the other hand, (Pi) 6=
0, consider act cxi jPi + c0jPi. Then in light of Theorem 2.6, dene a context-
dependent utility of xi in Pi in terms of the utility of c

xi jPi + c0jPi as follows
u(Pi; xi) :=
8<:c if (Pi) = 0;UcxiPi+c0Pi
(Pi)
if (Pi) 6= 0;
(2.16)
where c can be any number in [0; 1]. Finally, it remains to verify that < among
simple acts indeed admits an expected utility representation using the probabil-
ity measure  and utility function u given above. We put this claim in the form
of the following theorem. The rather straightforward proof is omitted.
Theorem 2.7 Let < be a preference relation over acts, if < satises P1-6, then
there exist a probability measure  on events and a utility function u on the
consequences such that, for any f; g;2 A0,
f < g ()
X
x2f(S)


f(s) = x

u
 
f 1(x); x
  X
x2g(S)


g(s) = x

u
 
g 1(x); x

:
3 Innitary Cases
Our method can be generalized to treat certain innitary case. There are acts,
f , in which there are countably many consequences, say x1; x2; : : : ; xn; : : : such
that f 1(xn) is a non-null set for every n. In other words, we allow the number
of cells of the partition in (2.12) to be unbounded. Then (2.16) and Theorem 2.7
also apply to this case, where the expected utility of f can be dened by
1X
i=1


f(s) = xi

u
 
f 1(xi); xi

(3.1)
provided that
P1
i=1 

f(s) = xi
  u f 1(xi); xi converges. It is dened as the
sum of the positive values minus the sum of the negative ones. Note that  does
not need to be countably additive. The expectation in that case is dened for
discrete random variables, for which the sum absolutely converges.
Finally, we point out that Savage needed the CAA because he wanted to
extend the expectation to continuous random variables, that is, he wanted to
dene the integral: Z
X(s) d(s) (3.2)
where X is a measurable function, which is interpreted in his system as a general
act with potentially uncountably many consequences, and  is a nitely additive
probability. Mathematically this is interesting. But we do not think that it is
required for applying his system to decision scenarios which a rational human
agent is expected to face.
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